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RECENT CASES
dant for committing the crime relating to these items, and arrest the suspect.
This sequence of events would be entirely consistent with the fourth amend-
ment. Moreover, the system which may be promulgated is consistent with recent
Supreme Court decisions establishing definite and effective guidelines for police
activity including invasions of privacy (e.g. "stop and frisk" 46 and wiretapping
situations47). In all of these cases the Court is limiting the extent to which the
police can invade an individual's privacy without prior judicial approval. Since
"the number of searches made incident to arrest far surpasses the number of
searches made under authority of a search warrant,148 Chimel may have a pro-
found effect on police practices.
SusAN LEVENBERG
CRIMINAL LAW-ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING-STANDING TO OBJECT TO
THIR PARTY CONVERSATIONS
Petitioners, Alderman and Alderisio, were convicted of conspiring to trans-
mit murderous threats in interstate commerce in violation of federal law.' The
court of appeals affirmed their convictions,2 and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.8 On petition for rehearing, the petitioners alleged that they had
recently discovered that Alderisio's place of business had been the subject of
electronic surveillance by the Government. The Government denied that it had
intercepted any conversations relevant to the prosecution. 4 The Court, how-
ever, reading the Government's response as admitting that Alderisio's conver-
sations had been overheard by unlawful electronic surveillance, granted the
petition for rehearing, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether the convictions
were tainted.5 Thereafter, the Government filed a motion to modify the order-
the record of such illegal surveillance should be inspected by the trial judge
in camera turning over to petitioners only those materials relevant to their
prosecution. Upon hearing argument on that motion, the Supreme Court agreed
to hear the case again.6 The Court further directed the parties to brief the
46. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. Comment, 1966 U. Irx. L!F. 255 at 278.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 875(c) (1964).
2. Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967).
3. Kolod v. United States, 389 U.S. 834 (1967).
4. In its brief for reargument, the Government asserted that no electronic surveillance
was conducted at places owned by Alderisio, but rather was carried out only at premises
owned by his associates or by firms which employed him; that Alderisio himself did not
have desk space at the subject premises; and finally, that Alderman neither participated in
any of the recorded conversations nor had any interest in the premises where the conversa-
tions were recorded. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 168 n.1 (1969).
5. Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136 (1968).
6. Alderman v. United States, 392 U.S. 919 (1968).
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issues of disclosure and standing with respect to the Government's use of evi-
dence obtained as a result of illegal surveillance. Upon reargument, the Su-
preme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
case to the district court. Held, one, whose premises have been the subject of
illegal surveillance by the Government, has standing to object to the admission
of evidence obtained as a result of such illegal surveillance, whether or not he
was present or participated in the recorded conversation.7 Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).8
Although the fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and sei-
zures 9 there are no procedural methods embodied within it to insure that the
prohibition will be carried out. While it may be assumed that such a prohibi-
tion would have been self-executing, Adams v. New York'0 proved that sup-
position incorrect. To give full effect to the protection required by the fourth
amendment, the Supreme Court formulated the exclusionary rule1' in the case
of Weeks v. United States.'2 The essence of the rule is that evidence illegally
obtained by federal officers is inadmissible in federal prosecutions. While the
rationale behind the rule was to give some effect to the protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures afforded by the Constitution, 8 for some time
it was viewed merely as a rule of procedure to be followed in federal courts.
Thus, in Wolf v. Colorado,'4 the Court held that, while the fourth amendment
applies to the states through the due process clause, the exclusionary rule, as
7. As to the disclosure issue, the Court also held that any surveillance records to which
any petitioner has standing to object should be turned over to him without first being sub-
mitted to the trial judge for in camera inspection. This note, however, will limit itself to
the issue of standing.
8. Other petitioners, Ivanov and Butenko, were convicted of conspiring to transmit
information relating to the national defense of the United States to the Soviet Union and
of conspiring to have caused Butenko to act as an agent of the Soviet Union without prior
notification to the Secretary of State. After their convictions had been affirmed, United
States v. Ivanov, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967), certiorari was granted upon the allegation
that illegal surveillance had occurred in connection with their convictions. Petitioners' ap-
peals were amended to raise issues identical to those raised in the Alderman case, and the
two cases were consolidated for argument.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things or be seized.
10. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Police officers searched the defendant's office and seized policy
slips and private papers. They had a search warrant for the policy slips, but they did not
have one for the private papers. When the defendant objected to the receipt in evidence of
the private papers, the Court answered by saying that once evidence has been introduced
and proven, it would "not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence was
obtained." Id. at 594.
11. This has been codified into FED. R. Camr. P. 41 (e).
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). A federal marshal with no warrant searched the defendant's
room and found papers linking him to a lottery. The papers were admitted into evidence
after a motion for return of the property had been refused.
13. "To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest.
neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the
protection of the people against such unauthorized action." Id. at 394.
14. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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a means of implementing the fourth amendment, does not apply to the states;
and, in Rowan v. United States,'5 it was held that evidence illegally obtained
by state officials was admissible in federal prosecutions. The principle endorsed
by the Court in Rowan was finally overruled in Elkins v. United States,'6 where
the Court held that any evidence illegally obtained, whether by state or federal
officers, is inadmissible in a federal prosecution; and likewise, the Wolf decision
was finally overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,'7 where the Court held that "all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by the
same authority, inadmissible in a state court."'' 8 Thus, the exclusionary rule
developed as a limitation read into the fourth amendment, rather than merely
a rule of procedure to be followed only in federal courts.
Just as it took the greater part of five decades for the Court to determine
whether the exclusionary rule was applicable in state prosecutions as well as
in federal prosecutions, it took a similar period of time to determine the scope
of the protection of the fourth amendment. The first case to consider the prob-
lem of whether conversations were within the protection of the fourth amend-
ment was Olmstead v. United States.'9 There, the defendant's conversations
were overheard by officers who had tapped his telephone from points outside
his premises. As a result of information obtained through the wiretap, the de-
fendant was convicted. The Court, affirming the conviction, held that the fourth
amendment applied only to material objects, and, without a physical invasion
of the defendant's premises, the "search" was not violative of the fourth amend-
ment. Subsequently, in Silverman v. United States,20 the Court confirmed the
physical invasion requirement of Olmstead, and reversed the convictions of the
petitioners. The Court held that where, as in this case, eavesdropping is accom-
plished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into premises occupied
by the defendant, the evidence so obtained is inadmissible in testimony. Thus,
even after Silverman, a person's private conversations were only brought within
the protection of the fourth amendment when they had been overheard by
means of surveillance which physically invaded the person's home.
In Katz v. United States,2 ' the Court discarded the trespass doctrine of
Olmstead and Silverman. In that case, federal officers had placed a listening
device on the outside of a public telephone booth frequented by the defendant.
15. 281 F. 137 (5th Cir. 1922).
16. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Defendants were indicted in a federal district court for in-
tercepting and divulging telephone conversations. The indictments were based upon evidence
unlawfully seized by Oregon law enforcement officers. The defendants moved to have the
evidence suppressed, but the district court denied the motion because federal officers had
not participated in the seizure.
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The defendant was prosecuted in an Ohio state court for
possession of lewd and lascivious materials. Evidence admitted in trial had been unlawfully
obtained by police officers who had forcibly entered the defendant's house and handcuffed
the defendant while they searched her house.
18. Id. at 655.
19. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
20. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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By means of the listening device, the officers overheard conversations made by
the defendant. The Court, reversing the defendant's conviction, held that the
fourth amendment protects people, not simply areas, against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and, where one justifiably relies upon the privacy which
he seeks, it is within the protection of the fourth amendment.22 Thus, so long
as conversations were made with the expectation that they would be private,
they were constitutionally protected from unreasonable seizure by the fourth
amendment.
Even though the exclusionary rule is a means of implementing the rights
set out in the fourth amendment, an individual must establish that he has the
requisite standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. Standing is a procedural
concept which provides that a person cannot challenge the action of another
party unless he can show that he has been injured or that he is threatened
with injury.2 3 In general, the result of standing has been to limit judicial review.
The courts have developed an exclusionary rule to give substance to the rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment yet have applied the concept of standing
to limit its application and to avoid deciding constitutional issues.
Historically, standing to suppress evidence unreasonably seized has been
based upon the permise that fourth amendment rights are personal rights, and
as such, can be invoked only by those whose rights have been violated. 24 Tra-
ditionally, the courts have required that the aggrieved person claim some pro-
prietary or possessory interest in either the premises searched or the articles
seized before he had standing to suppress evidence at trial.25 A strict applica-
tion of the requirement of a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises
searched gave only an owner, lessee, or a lawful occupant of the premises stand-
ing. 26 Employees27 and corporate officials 28 were usually denied standing. The
essential test was whether or not the person dwelled in the premises: if he did,
standing was granted; if he did not, it was denied.2 9 A strict application of the
requirement of having a possessory or proprietary interest in the articles seized
22. "The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the peti-
tioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to
penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance." Id. at 353.
23. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
24. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942); Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d
164 (10th Cir. 1929).
25. Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921
(1955); In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1942).
26. Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); Coon v. United States, 36
F.2d 164 (10th Cir. 1929).
27. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932); Wida v. United States, 52 F.2d
424 (8th Cir. 1931).
28. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); Newinghamn
v. United States, 4 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1925).
29. United States v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1933); Kelley v. United States,
61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932).
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created a dilemma. If a person claimed an interest in the articles seized, thereby
meeting the standing requirement under the fourth amendment, he automatically
waived his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by admitting that
he had an interest in those articles.30 Where a defendant was charged with pos-
session of an item, in order to claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule, he was
forced to admit his guilt by claiming an interest in the specified item. However,
where a person wished to preserve his right against self-incrimination, he was
required to disclaim any interest in the seized articles, thereby failing to meet
the standing requirement imposed under the exclusionary rule.31
In Jones v. United States3 2 the Court liberalized the traditional standing
requirements. There the Court held that a person had standing to have evidence
suppressed when he was legitimately on the premises searched or when the
offense charged hinged on the possession of the seized item. The Court elim-
inated the rigid requirements of either being an owner, lessee, or lawful occupant
of the premises searched. By granting standing to seek suppression of an item,
the possession of which was the offense charged, the Court did away with the
anomaly of forcing a person either to claim or disclaim some interest in the
seized article. No longer was one required to choose between his fourth or fifth
amendment rights.
Significant in the standing cases is that they each involved situations where
only tangible property was seized. While Katz was the first case to bring con-
versational privacy within the protection of the fourth amendment, Alderman
is the first case to determine when a person's conversational privacy has been
invaded.
In the instant case, the Court expressed reluctance to depart from the
existing rule that neither evidence obtained by unlawful wiretapping or eaves-
dropping nor its fruits may be used against the person aggrieved by such an
invasion of privacy.33 Thus the Court reasoned that anyone would be entitled
to the suppression of evidence which is obtained as a result of electronic sur-
veillance in violation of the individual's fourth amendment rights. 4 Inasmuch
as the fourth amendment now protects a person's private conversations as well
as tangible property, the Court analogized private conversations to tangible
property. The Court reasoned that the fruits of an illegal search are equally in-
30. "(N]or shall any person . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.. . ." US. CoNsT. amend. V.
31. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). "Men may wince at admitting
that they were the owners, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at once to
secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the perils of the part; but equivocation will
not serve. If they come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough detail to cast
them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that predicament; but they were
obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma." Id. at 630.
32. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). District of Columbia police officers searched the apartment
that the defendant was staying at under the authority of a warrant. Upon finding narcotics
on an outside awning, the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics. The defen-
dant's motion to suppress was overruled on the ground that he had no standing.
33. Instant case at 175-76.
34. Id. at 176.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
admissible whether they are of overheard third party conversations or tangible
property belonging to persons other than a homeownerY5 The Court follows the
Katz rule that a person's private conversations are within the protection of the
fourth amendment. In addition, the Court extends standing to the owner of
premises whenever the Government invades the privacy of his premises, regard-
less of whether the intrusion is carried out by a physical search and seizure or
by electronic surveillance, and regardless of whether the owner of premises is
present.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented in the opinion, reasoning that the traditional
rules of standing employed by the Court are totally inapplicable to situations
involving infringements of conversational privacy.36 Justice Harlan would hold,
therefore, that standing should be granted only to those who actually partic-
ipated in the conversations which were illegally overheard. 87 In addition, Mr.
Justice Harlan pointed out that inasmuch as the Court extended standing to
the owner of premises, to avoid future confusion, it should at least explain the
interest required- to invoke the special standing being granted.3
8
Mr. Justice Fortas concurred with the Court, but submitted that it should
have gone further in its holding. Justice Fortas viewed standing merely as a
legal technicality by which the courts allow governmental activity to circum-
vent the fourth amendment.3 9 To completely discard the principle of standing
would be directly contrary to precedent; accordingly, he reasoned that the
Court should at least follow past decisions fully and grant standing to anyone
against whom a search is directed.40 Inasmuch as the Government conducts an
unlawful search and seizure in order to obtain evidence against such a person,
Justice Fortas concluded that such a person is surely aggrieved and a victim
of an invasion of privacy.41
The exclusionary rule as originally announced in Weeks provided that one
whose premises were subject to an unreasonable search and seizure had stand-
ing to object to the admission of evidence seized as a result of such a search.
That rule was limited to physical objects, and the Court, in deciding cases
involving unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping, developed a trespass
doctrine to invoke the benefits of the exclusionary rule. Katz marked the first
instance in which the Court finally discarded the trespass doctrine and recog-
nized that an individual has a right to his conversational privacy. The principal
case represents a further application of the requirement of standing to invoke
the benefits of the exclusionary rule, thus extending both the scope of standing
and constitutional protections afforded to conversational privacy as enunciated
in Katz. Where under prior law the owner of premises had to show that there
35. Id. at 180.
36. Id. at 189.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 199-96.
39. Id. at 201.
40. Id. at 206-07.
41. Id. at 208-09.
RECENT CASES
had been a physical invasion of his premises before the fourth amendment was
,deemed to protect conversations occurring on his premises, 42 now he need only
show that such conversations had been unlawfully overheard there. Although
the decision broadens the scope of those who have standing, thereby giving
greater effect to the exclusionary rule, it fails to set down standards 'in the
area as it relates to electronic surveillance. In reaching its decision, the Court
fails to adequately discuss the consequences of its holding. Although the Court
indicated a willingness to adhere to the rule that fourth amendment rights are
personal rights 4 3 granting the owner of premises standing where his conversa-
tional privacy has not been directly violated at the same time implies a willing-
ness to depart from the personal rights rule. The Court appears to have merged
traditional property requirements with an individual's right to conversational
privacy as established in Katz. While the effect of the decision is to extend
the protection afforded to conversations, the Court failed to discuss the ap-
parent conflict between its present and past decisions. Although the Court
indicated that the owner of premises has standing to object to conversa-
tions unlawfully overheard on his premises, it failed to define the nature of the
property interest required to invoke standing. The reasonable consequence is
that the lower courts must now determ'ine the nature of that interest. This will
not be an easy task. The courts must first determine and understand the ration-
ale behind the present decision which is not apparent. The burden of the lower
courts will be further compounded by past decisions which have rejected
the requirement that one must have a possessory interest in the premises sub-
jected to an unreasonable search and seizure before he may invoke the exclu-
sionary rule. It seems clear that a person who has only a right to be on the
premises cannot claim prejudice or a violation of privacy if he is not a partic-
ipant in any overhead conversations. Whatever the decision of the lower courts,
it is clear that they should have been given more definite guidelines by the
Court. It is apparent, therefore, that principles developed for invoking the ex-
clusionary rule in connection with physical property cannot simply be extended
to apply to conversations without creating conflicting results. Thus, as electronic
surveillance becomes more sophisticated, the Court will undoubtedly have to
reconsider its previous position on the standing necessary to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule.
JOEL B. ScHWEITZER
42. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, .277
U.S. 438 (1928).
43. Instant case at 174.
(419
